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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NND 969 041
By 571/USW Date 6/11/85

AIRGRAM

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FILE DESIGNATION

A-117

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State *RS/R-File*

INFO: Amconsul CASABLANCA
Amconsul TANGIER

FROM : Amembassy RABAT

DATE: JUN 9, 1971

SUBJECT : Comments on Djerejian Proposal for Reorientation of
US Policy in Morocco

REF : Rabat A-97

In its A-97 of May 19, the Embassy forwarded to the Department an analysis by Mr. Edward Djerejian, the Labor-Political Officer at Casablanca, recommending a reorientation of U.S. policy in Morocco. Mr. Djerejian maintained that we are over-committed to Morocco and that our real interest here is in supporting an independent and democratic Morocco which will be able to achieve the social and economic development which is the basis of social justice. We made no comment on his analysis at that time but promised one later. A group of substantive officers and I have since discussed the report at some length with Mr. Djerejian himself and the following represents a distillation of our principal comments on the paper.

First of all, we all agree that Mr. Djerejian has done a useful job in focusing our attention on important aspects of our policy toward Morocco and of forcing us to reexamine some of the fundamental concepts under which we have been operating. I think he is to be commended for his imaginative and thoughtful analysis. We do not agree with all of it but we think it is provocative and worth discussing.

What Mr. Djerejian's recommendations amount to, we think, is that we dissociate ourselves from the regime and that we encourage those elements which are by their nature opposed to

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autocratic government in Morocco. This assumes the existence of such elements and that they are likely contenders for power. I do not know that such elements, having a realistic possibility of attaining power, do in fact exist. All observers seem to be agreed that the only likely force to mount a revolution here is the Army, and I do not think we would find the Army any less autocratic or more effective in promoting the social and economic development of the country than is the present regime. Nor do I think that lessening of our economic support to the regime would promote the economic and social development of the country.

There are two fundamental assumptions of Mr. Djerejian's analysis which seem open to question. One is that we are overcommitted here and the other is that radical change is inevitable. We have had a long discussion about whether or not we are overcommitted. I think we can all agree that our present commitment is an inheritance from the past. Were we to arrive on the scene today and were there no naval communications facilities here, I doubt we would decide that Morocco should be the largest AID recipient country in Africa. We would probably put some of that money some place else. The point is, however, that we are not arriving fresh on the scene and that to alter radically the level of our bilateral aid to Morocco would inevitably affect our relations with this government and would affect our tenure at Kenitra, Sidi Yahya and Bouknadel. I personally do not feel that in the circumstances we are overcommitted. While there may be some question about the utilization of some of the aid we have given Morocco, I think in general it has been well used and that our aid Mission is doing an effective job of stimulating the Moroccan government into rational change. We are getting value for our money in terms of our tenure at Kenitra and the other installations, and I understand that those installations are in fact of great value to our military forces.

We also find it difficult to accept the thesis that radical change here is inevitable. One can compare the population and unemployment figures with the pace of economic development and look at the examples set by other Arab countries and conclude that radical change within the next 10 years is possible, or even likely, but one should not conclude that it is inevitable.

We hold no brief for King Hassan but we do not think one should sell him short. A great deal of money and effort has gone into the building of

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infrastructure in this country, and they are on the eve of paying off -- structures like the new dams on the lower Moulouya and the Ziz Rivers are only now beginning to perform their planned functions. An era of agricultural development is opening up which may change many of our basic assumptions. It certainly is in our interests that these efforts come to fruition, that Morocco continue to enjoy stability and a reasonable degree of freedom and that King Hassan succeed in bringing this country through its transition from a traditional to a modern state by peaceful means. We may not approve totally of the way he is doing it, but our experiences with the Shah of Iran show that we are not always right about such things.

We fully agree with Mr. Djerejian that we should do what we can to urge the regime to increase popular participation in the development effort and to make better utilization of its human resources. Our leverage in this regard should not be overestimated, however, and a constant harping on this theme is likely to reduce our effectiveness. We also agree that we should not associate ourselves with the repressive political aspects of the regime and will do our best to avoid doing so. We doubt, however, that we could do much to change the regime's attitude or tactics towards the radical opposition, nor are we sure it would be wise to do so.

Mr. Djerejian recommended that we undertake an intensive informational and cultural effort to communicate and cultivate Moroccan youth and potential leaders. We are already carrying out a fairly active program in this regard, principally through USIS, and there are built-in limitations as to how far we can go because of the regime's desire to control contacts between foreigners and Moroccans. Our new Embassy Youth Committee is at the moment considering possibilities for new approaches in this field and it may be that we will decide to reexamine or retread some of our present programs.

Mr. Djerejian also recommended that we expand our contacts with representative social and political groups such as the trade union movement. From discussion with Mr. Djerejian we have learned that he has in mind more the question of contacts between diplomatic representatives here and labor leaders in Casablanca, for example. We have no problem with this and will try to improve our track record.

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Mr. Djerejian recommends expanding unilateral and multilateral assistance and eliminating bilateral assistance except for Promotion Nationale, Peace Corps and unilateral programs. We have also discussed this at some length and believe we have convinced Mr. Djerejian that in terms of his stated goal of promoting the economic and social development of Morocco, we have greater influence through a bilateral program than we would have if we relied entirely on multilateral efforts, even assuming the latter was possible under aid legislation.

Mr. Djerejian recommends reducing military assistance levels, but his recommendation seems to have been based upon a misunderstanding as to the nature and level of our assistance. Our program today consists of about \$1 million grant aid and \$10 million in credit sales each year. This is already a very modest program and in the present circumstances we think it is the minimum we can do and still make any effective contribution to the Moroccan defense capability. We think Morocco does need a defense capability and that it is in our interests to help develop it.

Finally, Mr. Djerejian recommends timely withdrawal from our installations at Kenitra, Sidi Yahya and Bouknadel if they are no longer in our strategic interests. We fully agree, but we believe that those installations are in fact in our strategic interests at present. Or rather, this is what we have been given to understand by Washington and we are in no position to judge otherwise.

This discussion calls to mind the fact that we still have no national policy paper for Morocco. We are aware of the problems with NSSM 87 but it seems to us that a thoroughgoing discussion of what our interests are and what we should be doing about them is still in order. If it does no more than highlight the need for such a discussion, Mr. Djerejian's paper will have served a useful purpose.

ROCKWELL
[Signature]

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